The Latest Data about Oil Production: Those Pesky Naked Apes are not Giving up their Addiction to Fossil Fuels.

 

The updated peak oil model proposed by Ron Patterson in his blog. The data are in million barrels (Mb) per day. Production stubbornly refuses to decline, and we may have a few years more before it finally peaks and starts going down.

Fossil fuels stubbornly refuse to die. The latest data reported in the excellent site "Peak Oil Barrel" summarizes the situation as it is now. The world oil production of "crude + condensate" (C+C) has nearly returned to the pre-COVID levels, may surpass them in 2025, and keep growing until 2028. Note that this is "conventional" oil; if we include "all liquids," and in particular tight oil, the amounts produced increase, but the peak date doesn't change much.

These data show that the global production of liquid fuels may stay for a few more years at levels near 100 Mb/day. Not only may oil production remain at the highest levels ever seen in history, but the same is true for the other two main fossil fuels: coal and natural gas (you can see some recent data in Gail Tverberg's blog). 

At the beginning of the current century, it was believed that geological and economic constraints would lead to reaching the maximum oil production ("peak oil") before the end of the 2nd decade of the century. But those estimates didn't consider how desperate the need for liquid fuel was. The result was an ace up the sleeve called "tight oil" or "shale oil." It was unexpected: most experts thought that shale oil was too expensive to have a role in the market. It didn't matter: shale oil production was financed and supported even though it required enormous investments in terms of resources. As a result, oil prices rose to levels considered unthinkable a few decades before, incidentally beggaring a large number of people. Among other things, shale oil allowed the United States to keep playing the Emperor of the Hill. 

How about the future? What we see in Patterson's graphs are model-based extrapolations with all the uncertainties involved. In particular, the model considers a symmetric production curve, with the decline mirroring growth. But that's not necessarily true. Any global shock, such as another pandemic, a major financial crash, or a large war, could cause production to plummet rapidly, giving the curve the "Seneca Shape" -- that is, with the decline much faster than growth. 

On the other hand, we cannot exclude another parting shot by the fossil industry. After seeing what they could do with tight oil, we cannot dismiss the possibility of a move to synthetic fuels manufactured from coal. The technology is known; coal is still relatively abundant, so it could be done. That would be a true Derringer up the sleeve, leading to several more years of production of liquid fuels at the current level. 

We have to face reality: the naked apes of planet Earth are not going to give up their addiction to crude oil. Not so soon, anyway. Dire climate scenarios, international treaties, or individual goodwill do not seem to affect the attempt to keep producing fossil fuels as much as possible, as fast as possible, up to the last drop of oil or the last lump of coal. Indeed, governments are specializing in a form of doublespeak that they use to proclaim that they care about reducing carbon emissions while at the same time encouraging the fossil industry to produce more ("green coal," anyone?)

So, what's going to happen? One possible scenario is that we simply keep going along the curves of Patterson's models. In this case, we have at least a few more years left to keep the world's economic system alive, even though ordinary people will all be progressively poorer because of the increasing energy costs to produce energy (declining EROI). Nevertheless, that could result in a certain degree of stability that would allow the deployment of a significantly large renewable infrastructure. In some 30 years projections indicate that it would be possible to sustain the global economy (or a smaller version of it) wholly on renewable energy. Would that be fast enough to save us from the collapse of the ecosystem? Probably not, since the collapse is already ongoing. In the case of a rush to synfuels, then, an ecosystemic collapse would be surely unavoidable. Besides involving a disastrous increase in carbon emissions, synfuels would subtract precious resources from the task of building a renewable infrastructure. In this case, the Derringer up the sleeve would be used to shoot oneself. 

Another scenario involves the deployment of geoengineering on a massive scale to avoid the most damaging consequences of global warming on the economy. The uncertainties are enormous, but, if it were to work, it would give humankind some time to apply the "Sower's Strategy," allocating a sufficient fraction of the remaining fossil energy to the move to renewables.

There are other possible scenarios: one is the "transition to panic," according to Schlesinger's principle ("humans have only two modes of operation: complacency and panic"). Panic could be generated by growing evidence of the ongoing climate catastrophe. That might finally lead to a serious effort to curb the use of fossil fuels or, more likely, to more sophisticated doublespeak about green coal. Conversely, panic about a collapsing economy could lead to a backlash against renewable energy, accused of being the culprit of whatever disaster befalls humankind. After reading comments of people seriously claiming that induction stoves have been purposefully designed to starve them to death, anything can happen. And that, obviously, would lead humankind straight into a climate catastrophe.

As usual, the future is uncertain and always surprising. The only certain thing is that we are going to see enormous changes, and those changes may be bad, but they are also opportunities. The "Seneca Cliff" always involves a "Seneca Rebound" that may allow us to shape human society in a way that does not fight the ecosystem but adapts to it: the "Sunflower Paradigm." 

Humankind's Tragic Mistake: How we Blew our Chances of Survival

 

A chronicle of how our civilization (if we want to call it in this way) blew its chance of survival. If we had invested in what really mattered, energy, we could have made it. But we preferred to invest in the toys we like so much: military hardware. And think that these 6 trillion dollars of hardware were used to make sure that some foreigners would send us the energy the US needed. With the same money, we could have had the same amount of energy produced at home. So much money thrown away, and that doesn't count the damage done on the receiving end. And now we are throwing away another good chunk of our remaining resources to follow the impossible hydrogen dream

 

An amazing article by Paul Gipe.

https://www.renewableenergyworld.com/2019/12/19/beating-swords-into-plowshares-or-wind-turbines-solar-panels-we-could-have-done-it/

 

 

We Could Have 100% Renewable Electricity If We Had Invested in Wind and Solar Instead of War in the Middle East

Yes, the United States could be generating 100% of its electricity from renewable energy if we had used the money spent on our ill-advised wars in the Middle East to build wind and solar systems, as well as battery storage, here at home.

That’s the startling conclusion of a simple calculation my colleague Robert Freehling and I made after the latest reports on the economic cost of our wars in the Middle East.

This is, after all, not rocket science. Money spent on war–anywhere–is money lost. It’s not an investment in the future. It’s money quite literally that goes up in smoke.

In contrast, money spent on building wind and solar farms or putting solar systems on rooftops is money invested in the future that will be earning returns–in the form of electricity–for 20 to 30 years.

I’ve followed this topic since the invasion of Iraq in 2003. I posted my first article on this subject on July 4, 2005, and I’ve been updating that article periodically since then as the cost of our wars continued to grow.

On the anniversary of September 11th this year, news articles on the cost of the war in Afghanistan prompted me to take another look at our lost opportunities to invest in infrastructure here at home for the direct benefit of Americans.

What I learned shocked me. Using what I call a back-of-the-envelope method, I calculated that we could have installed enough wind turbines to more than provide 100% of our electricity with what we’d spent on war.

That just didn’t seem right. These are big numbers and it’s easy to get them wrong. After all, we’ve been told for decades that it’s simply too expensive to install that many wind turbines and solar panels. We could never afford it, critics warned.

So I called my colleague and renewable energy analyst Robert Freehling for help. I’ve relied on Freehling to sort out such thorny problems in the past.

His conclusion? Yes, we could be generating 100% of our electricity in this country from just wind and solar; that is, not counting existing hydro, geothermal, or biomass generation. Freehling, though, goes even further. We would be generating so much renewable electricity that we could store huge amounts in batteries–electricity storage that also would be paid for with our “war savings.”

How did we reach such a conclusion? Did we use a supercomputer to calculate all the possible permutations of what a renewable electricity supply would look like?

No. We kept it simple. We looked at two respected estimates of what our wars have cost in economic terms to the US taxpayer, not what they’ve cost in human suffering, nor what they’ve cost the countries on the receiving end of our expenditures.

The National Priorities Project calculates that the wars in the Middle East since 2001 have cost $4.9 trillion, a sum that continues to rise. The Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University estimates $5.9 trillion through Fiscal Year 2019. Their latest estimate raises that to $6.4 trillion through FY 2020.

To paraphrase Senator Everett Dirksen, “A trillion here, a trillion there and pretty soon it adds up to real money.” For a sense of perspective, one billion is 1,000 million. Thus, a trillion is one million million. That’s a one with twelve zeros behind it–a very big number.

We made no attempt to match the annual costs of the wars to the deployment of wind and solar. Again, we kept it simple. We simply prorated the costs over two decades with the exception explained below.

Freehling’s simple spreadsheet model assumes ramping up installations from a low base over a decade to reflect the necessity of scaling up manufacturing to meet the demand. Then he held installations constant for another decade until he reached 100% renewable generation from wind and solar. If we had started in 2001, the whole conversion would be accomplished by 2020.

Shockingly, there was a lot of money left over. So Freehling plowed the remainder into battery storage using the same approach as with wind and solar. He scaled installations up from a low base until the industry was likely to reach maturity.

Existing renewable generation from hydro, geothermal, and biomass was then shunted into the mass of new storage. Batteries would be used to equalize the grid when winds were light or the sun had set. The remainder could then be used to charge electric vehicles.

Wind and solar are cheap today. That was not so, two decades ago. Freehling accounts for this by using historical figures for the cost of wind and solar.

He dropped the initial cost of wind from $2,500 per kilowatt of installed capacity in the year 2000 to about $1,400 today.

Solar has seen a dramatic drop in cost during the past two decades. Freehling used $12,000 per kilowatt as the cost of solar capacity in 2000 and dropped it to nearly $1,500 per kilowatt in 2020.

We apportioned how much wind and how much solar were built, based on the work of my French colleague Bernard Chabot. He found that for a temperate climate, such as the United States, the optimum mix of generation is 60% wind and 40% solar energy. This mix minimizes the amount of storage needed.

Batteries are still expensive. The cost of battery storage, however, has fallen 80% in the past decade alone notes Freehling. He suggests that the cost of battery storage would have fallen even more rapidly through economies-of-scale if we had begun deploying them at scale sooner. Batteries for Electric Vehicles (EVs) would also be cheaper today if we had plowed some of our war savings into battery development.

Here in California, the Independent System Operator (Cal-ISO) requires 4-hours of storage for it to reliably meet peak demand.” Our scenario calls for one million megawatts of wind and another one million megawatts of solar. This scenario uses some 700,000 MW of batteries to store 3 terawatt-hours (TWh) or 3 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity. The amount of storage is approximately enough to meet the peak electricity demand for the entire United States for a period of 4 hours.

All together, wind, solar, and storage would be capable of providing 4,400 TWh per year–the amount of electricity generated annually in the United States–for an investment of $6 trillion over two decades.

The United States produces more than 700 TWh per year–about 17% of annual electricity generation–from existing wind, solar, hydro, geothermal, and biomass. Existing renewables would be capable of powering more than one-third to as much as one-half of the entire US passenger vehicle fleet with electricity.

If we had instead invested the $6 trillion we squandered on war in the Middle East, we would, two decades later, have made our grid more resilient with battery storage, and be generating 100% of our electricity with wind and solar. Moreover, existing sources of renewable energy would be sufficient to power a substantial portion of our passenger cars with clean, renewable electricity.

Incredible.

What a lost opportunity.
———-
Paul Gipe is a renewable energy analyst and the author of Wind Energy for the Rest of Us. He has worked with wind energy for the past four decades.

• United States Budgetary Costs and Obligations of Post-9/11 Wars through FY2020: $6.4 Trillion

• Cost of National Security, National Priorities Project

• Watson Institute of Public Affairs, Brown University, Economic Costs of War

• Beating Swords into Wind Turbines–or Solar Panels if You Like, December 29, 2007. This op-ed was originally posted on July 4, 2005 and then appeared at Renewable Energy Access.com (Now RenewableEnergyWorld.com) on July 11, 2005. This version has been updated with current figures for the cost of the war and estimates of its total direct and indirect costs (to the USA only).