Electric Cars as a Gift from God

 

An electric car on display at the WDCC (World Design Cities Conference) in Shanghai, Sept 2023. Not the finger of God pointing at it. Such a display is nearly inconceivable in the West, where the fossil lobby is mounting a strong propaganda campaign against everything renewable or "green."

China is different for many reasons, but one is how they see technology. Unlike the Western attitude, which has come to see science and technology as inherently evil, the Chinese have a sane attitude that sees technology as something useful for people. Hence, the emphasis is on renewable energy and electric cars. At the WDCC Conference, my colleagues told me that they are convinced that photovoltaic energy is a gift that China is making to the whole world that will usher a new age of prosperity and a new culture of sustainability for everyone. 

Not everything that China does agrees with this goal, and they still rely on coal for their energy supply. But the idea is there, and you know that when the Chinese decide that they want to do something, they usually succeed. And I think they will with this one!

And, as you can see, the views in the West on electric cars are different.

  

 

Scorched Europe: Can Renewable Energy Save Us?

 

Figure from Ballester et Al. 2023 showing the average summer temperatures in several Western European States. The situation is rapidly becoming dramatic, and renewables will be desperately needed not just as a replacement for fossil fuels but as a tool for adaptation. 

This July has seen the highest temperatures ever recorded in Europe and worldwide. It is not an exceptional event but part of a trend. Take a look at the graph above; there is no other way to define it than scary. If the trend of the past 10 years is maintained, then the average summer temperature in Europe will keep rising by about 0.14 °C every year. It means one more degree by 2030 and three additional degrees by 2050. And it could be much worse: the authors of the paper interpreted the growth as linear, but these complex systems tend to go exponentially. Maybe the temperature increase could start tapering down, too. But it is safe to assume that the trend will continue and Southern Europe will be especially hit. "Scorched Europe"? Yes. 

Plenty of people find these data surprising. Most have in mind the "1.1 °C" increase normally mentioned when dealing with global warming. But that's a global average of land and sea temperatures, and the sea warms less than the land mainly because it has a larger heat capacity. The summer temperatures on land are another story and are what kills people when they appear in the form of heat waves. Last summer, we had 60,000 excess deaths in Southern Europe correlated to the heat waves. This summer, things seem to be a little better, but how about a future with four extra degrees of warming? And it is not just a question of heat waves: the changes in the ecosystems are going to be profound and irreversible. We may expect drought, desertification, land erosion, and extreme meteorological events. 

The standard wisdom is that we can stop climate change by phasing out the consumption of fossil fuels and hence CO2 emissions. It could be obtained by better efficiency, energy saving, and the diffusion of renewable energy (nuclear energy could also be used, although with many additional problems). It is possible, but could it be done fast enough? Let's see a projection from the recent report to the Club of Rome "Earth for All," a global modeling of the world's economic system. 

You see the energy transition in terms of the phasing out of CO2 emissions. In the "Giant Leap" scenario, the transition is completed by 2050. You can see similar scenarios, although more detailed, in the IPCC reports. Even the most optimistic projections do not see the disappearance of fossil fuel use before 2050-2060.

Now, what would be the effects on global temperatures of phasing out fossil fuels by 2050? The "Earth for All" study models that, too. (the IPCC scenarios provide similar results): 

You see that there is not such a big difference between the two scenarios. Even after that fossil fuel consumption has been brought to zero, in 2050, temperatures keep rising for more than 30 years. It is expected. Reducing or even zeroing emissions does not remove CO2 from the atmosphere; it only stops its concentration from increasing. The system has a certain time lag that keeps it warming even though emissions have become zero. For this reason, most of the IPCC scenarios assume the use of carbon sequestration technologies to be deployed after 2050, even though nobody knows for sure how these technologies could work. Note also that these calculations do not take into account the possibility of "tipping points" that could unbalance the system and cause drastic, rapid, and irreversible changes.  

The point is that if the ratio of European temperatures to global temperatures is maintained at the current values, a global increase of more than 2 degrees corresponds to about 4 degrees more on land in Europe. So, even with optimistic assumptions, it seems that a rapid transition away from fossil fuels can't prevent radical changes in the climate system. 

Does that mean renewables are useless? Not at all. Renewables, so far, have been considered mainly as a tool for mitigation of global warming. That is, as tools to reduce and eventually eliminate CO2 emissions. But we'll also need renewables as adaptation tools. At this point, it is clear that we need energy in order to survive. 

In the future, Southern Europe may well become an environment comparable to the present one in places such as Dubai, where the average daily summer temperature is about 34 °C. Residents say that there are only three seasons in Dubai: spring, summer, and hell. In summer, people live in air-conditioned homes and move in air-conditioned vehicles to reach air-conditioned spaces for work or for social activities. They drink desalinated water and consume imported food, or food cultivated in irrigated areas. It is perfectly possible to cultivate the Arabian desert, provided that the land can be irrigated, and that requires energy.

Can Southern Europe adopt similar strategies? Yes, but that needs energy. Dubai has an ample supply of low-cost fossil fuels from the neighboring countries, sufficient to create the artificial environments that keep people alive during the summer. They are moving toward renewables, but they are starting from very low levels. In Europe, instead, the fossil fuel supply is limited and expensive, but renewables are already covering a large fraction of consumption (more than 20%). This supply can be gradually increased to support adaptation. We need air-conditioned spaces for people in summer, we need to manage the land to avoid erosion and desertification, to reforest degraded areas, to create water reservoirs, and more. We may need to use renewable-powered precision fermentation to provide food independently of agriculture. 

The renewable-based mitigation scenario is a likely path that the warming-stricken regions may gradually follow, perhaps unwillingly but forced to by the circumstances. People will desperately want air-conditioning even though they keep screaming that global warming does not exist or that "climate always changes." Of course, there are various forms that this strategy may take, and it may be accompanied by massive migration toward Northern Countries and by attempts to drastically draw down CO2 from the atmosphere. Both would require huge amounts of energy. 

At present, these scenarios are politically taboo in the discussion in Europe. Most people in the region seem to ignore or deny the very existence of global warming or to consider it nothing more than a minor nuisance. That may slow down the efforts to mitigate it or to adapt to it. Eventually, though, change is unavoidable. Obviously, nobody likes the idea of Italy looking like Dubai a few decades from now, but it could be much worse. 

The Warthog and the Sunflower: Energy and the End of Empires

 

The warthog and the sunflower have a common characteristic: they are both dissipative structures powered by thermodynamic potentials. And they share this characteristic with much larger and more complicated structures, such as empires. Warthogs and Sunflowers need metabolic energy (food) to survive: no food -- no warthogs, and no sunflowers either. If we want our civilization to survive, we need "food" in the form of energy potentials that we can dissipate. So far, our food has been in the form of fossil fuels. Will we be able to found a new, and perhaps more nutritious, food in the form of solar energy?  

"The End of Empires" is a multi-author book published by Springer in 2022.  In 744 pages, it covers the collapse and the disappearance of 32 empires, from Akkad to the modern US Empire, over some five thousand years. I got myself a copy, but I must say I was a little disappointed. Not that it is not good scholarship. It is a wide-ranging treatise that provides much food for thought. But in terms of understanding why empires fall, well, it doesn't say much. 

I am not saying I know more than historians about history; I am sure they have a deep grasp of many details and events that pertain to human empires, much better than anything I can manage to know. But the problem with this book is the lack of a common thread in the story of these 32 empires. In every chapter, you read of things that happen: battles fought, laws enacted, rulers coming and going, neighbors invading or being invaded, all sorts of things, and yet, somehow, these apparently unrelated events always gang together to bring down the whole stupendous edifice. It reminds Shakespeare's line, "When sorrows come, they come not single spies, but in battalions." Shakespeare was a poet, not a historian, but he grasped a basic point: sorrows do come in battalions, but why?

In "The End of Empires," the discussion on this point is mainly in the first introductory chapter, where the authors endeavor to tell us that empires may fall because of three factors; 1) Internal factors, 2) External factors, and 3) Unforeseen events. Which is tantamount to saying that anything and everything can bring down empires, But, again, why?   

If you are reading this blog, "The Sunflower Paradigm," you are interested in energy, and I think you are prepared to accept the idea that what keeps empires together is nothing but energy. No energy -- no empire. 

This concept would be basically incomprehensible for someone who doesn't have a minimum training in the mechanisms that keep complex systems "alive." It is energy. It is an intuition that goes back to Ilya Prigogine, who proposed the concept of "dissipative structures."  A definition that can be applied to many things, from warthogs to sunflowers, including empires. 

A dissipative structure is something that emerges out of energy potentials. It is actually strictly linked to the definition of "potential," which has to be understood as something that can be dissipated, that is turned into entropy. Dissipative structures are self-assembled machines that turn energy potentials into entropy, that is low-temperature heat that disappears in the environment. 

Think of a living being. It lives on the energy produced by the energy potential stored in food, metabolic energy. No metabolism, no life. You can say that of a warthog or a sunflower: no food -- no warthog, and not even a sunflower. You can say the same for empires, although their metabolic processes are quite different from those of biological creatures. 

The concept of dissipative structures is wide-ranging, and it is an incredibly useful tool for understanding how the universe works. You can use it in physics, chemistry, and, yes, in the science of those complex systems we call human social structures. Empires, for instance. The simple concept that energy (more exactly, energy potentials) creates social structures is a powerful tool for understanding the mechanism of the collapse of empires. 

Of the 32 chapters of the book, none mentions energy flows. Maybe you know that in 1984 the German historian Demandt listed 210 (!!) causes of why the Roman Empire fell, including such concepts as “Tiredness of life” and “Escapism." You can't accuse historians of lacking fantasy, but you might perhaps propose that they don't have a good understanding of the mechanisms that create and destroy these large human enterprises. 

Only recently, the historian Thomas Homer-Dixon proposed that the Roman collapse was the result of the decline of the energy return on energy investment (EROI) of the Roman society. It was a good idea, although vague as it was proposed. But it was approximately correct. The Roman Empire was a stupendous structure that relied mostly on slaves as its source of energy. Slaves cultivated the land that provided food, then they also mined gold and silver to pay the military apparatus, the legions, and the civilian bureaucracy that kept the empire together. The whole machine required gold and silver to keep working. Soldiers wouldn't fight without being paid, and the same was for civil servants. 

We have little or no evidence of a decline in the productivity of Roman agriculture until the last gasps of the empire, during the 5th century AD. But we do have evidence that the mining system of the empire collapsed during the 3rd century. It was because depletion made mining more and more expensive. The Empire would have needed many more slave miners than it could afford to have. So, it became unable to mine gold. No gold, no legions, no legions, no empire. And the whole system went through that kind of transformation that simply meant it had to reduce its rate of entropy dissipation. The end of the empire.

The same story is playing out in our case. Depletion of our fossil resources (our "energy slaves") is making us less and less able to provide the kind of energy that makes our civilization able to create entropy at a rate much faster than any previous civilization in history. And, if we keep going along the road we are following, it doesn't help to talk of being "more efficient" or developing "new economic paradigms." There is no other destination for us than a society working at a much lower dissipation rate. A low metabolism society, agricultural, or even based on hunting and gathering. 

That is our destiny unless we manage to replace fossil fuels with a comparable, and perhaps much higher, energy potential that we can dissipate. It was the dream of the 1950s, the "atomic age," that never really materialized. Today, solar energy could provide the potential that we need to maintain a high dissipation rate. The society that could develop out of this jump to a new source could be as different from ours as a warthog is different from a sunflower. Still, it will be based on a fast metabolic rate. Will it come? We can't say, but whatever will happen, will happen because it had to happen. 

(A more detailed discussion of mine on the collapse of the Roman Empire)

The Next One Hundred Years: A Story Told in Three Scenarios

 

Looking back at how the future was seen half a century ago, it is amazing to see how things have changed. When the conquest of space seemed to be the obvious way forward, nobody would have imagined that, today, we would be discussing the probability of survival of humankind, and that many of us would judge it as low. 

Yet, even though the future remains obscure, it still follows the laws of the universe. And one of these laws is that civilizations exist because they have a supply of energy. No energy, no civilization. So, the key element of the future is energy; the idea that it would be cheap and abundant gave rise to the dream of the conquest of space in the 1950s. Today, the idea that it will be neither gives rise to the prospects of doom. 

So, let me try a simple "scenario analysis" of what may happen in the future in the next century or so in terms of choices that will determine the energy infrastructure that could support a complex civilization (if any will survive). We are in a moment of transition, and the choices that will be made in the next few years (not decades) will determine the future of humankind. 

_________________________________________________________________

Scenario #0: collapse. I call this a "non-scenario" in the sense that it assumes that nothing is done or, anyway, too little and too late. In this case, people remain stuck in their old paradigms, the resources that kept society alive are not replaced, and it becomes impossible to maintain a degree of complexity comparable to the current one. Within some decades, humans return to an economy that we might describe as "medieval," if we are lucky. But we might also go back to hunting and gathering or even, simply, go extinct. Personally, I see this scenario as the most likely one, but not an obligate outcome of the current situation. 

Scenario #1: Sticking to Fossil Fuels. Here, we see a repetition of the events that led to stemming the decline of oil production during the first two decades of the 20th century. It was done by pouring large amounts of resources into the "fracking" of tight oil deposits. It produced a temporary resurrection of the oil industry in the US, bringing production to levels never seen before, albeit at enormous economic and environmental costs. The same policy could be continued with renewed efforts, for instance, at exploiting tight oil deposits outside the United States, tar sands, or maybe making synthetic fuels out of coal. That could maintain the production of fossil fuels to levels similar to the current ones. It would make it possible to keep alive the military apparatuses of the main states, and at least some of the current organizations and social structures. But the cost would be enormous, and it would imply beggaring most of the world's population, as well as unimaginable damage to the ecosystem. This strategy could keep a semblance of the current civilization going on for a few decades, hardly more than the end of the century. Then, it will be Scenario #0, but the crash will be even worse than if it had arrived by doing nothing.

Scenario #2: Going Nuclear. Supporting a complex society on nuclear energy may be possible, but it is complicated by several factors. Among these are the limited uranium resources, the need for rare mineral resources for the plants, and the strategic problems involved in disseminating nuclear technologies and uranium processing knowledge all over the world. Because of the limited amounts of mineral uranium, it is well known that the existing technology of light water reactors would not be able to supply the current global energy demand for more than a few decades, at best for a century or so. Then the outcome would be again scenario #0. The fuel supply could be greatly increased by moving to the challenging task of "breeding" new fuels from thorium or non-fissile uranium. If that were possible, a complex civilization could continue to exist for several centuries, or even more. In all cases, a major war that would target the nuclear plants would rapidly send a nuclear civilization to scenario #0.

Scenario #3: The Solar Era. In this case, we see the continuation of the current trend that sees renewable energy technologies, mainly solar photovoltaic and wind, rapidly expanding. If this expansion continues, it can make both fossil fuels and nuclear energy obsolete. Renewable technologies have a good energy return on energy investment (EROI) and little need for rare minerals. Renewables are not a strategic problem, have no direct military interest, and can be used everywhere. The plants can be recycled, and they are expected to be able to support a complex society; even though in a form that, today, we can only barely imagine. A solar-based infrastructure is also naturally forced to reach a certain degree of stability because of the limited flux of solar energy available. So, a solar-based civilization could reach a stable state that could last at least as long as agricultural societies did in the past, thousands of years, or even longer.

Combined Scenarios #1, #2, #3: Feudalization. The three scenarios above are based on the idea that human civilization remains reasonably "global." In this case, the competition between different technologies would play out at a global scale and determine a winner that would take over the whole energy market. But that's not necessarily the case if the world's economic systems separate into independent sections, as it appears to be happening right now. In this case, some regions might adopt different strategies, fossils, nuclear, or renewables, while some would simply be shut off from the energy supply system and go directly to "Scenario #0."  With lower demand, the problems of depletion of nuclear and fossils would be greatly eased, although, of course, only for a limited population. Note also that these near-independent regions can be described as "feudal," but need to be much larger and more structured than anything seen during the historical Middle Ages. Keeping alive complex technologies, nuclear in particular, requires maintaining a functioning industrial society, and that may not be obvious in a time of diminishing returns for everything. 

The next few decades will decide which direction humankind will take. No one has the hands on the wheel that moves the giant thing we call "civilization," and we are seeing efforts to push it in one of the three scenarios above (some people even seem to be actively pushing for scenario #0, a civilization-level expression of what Sigmund Freud called the "death instinct"). 

The problem, here, is that the Western governance system has evolved in such a way that no decision can be taken unless some groups or sectors of society are demonized, and then a narrative is created that implies fighting a common enemy. In other words, no decision can be taken on the basis of data and planning for the common good, but only as the result of the confrontation of the lobbies involved in supporting different options. (*)

We have seen the demonization-based decision mechanism operating during the past few decades. It is a well-honed procedure, and we may expect it to be also applied to the allocation of resources for new energy strategies. We have already seen an energy technology being demonized;  it was the case of nuclear energy in the 1970s, the target of a successful propaganda campaign that presented it as an enemy of humankind. Today, renewables and everything "green" may soon be the victims of a new demonization campaign designed to promote nuclear energy. We are seeing it in its early stages, (see this article by George Monbiot), but it is clearly growing and having a certain degree of success.

Nothing is decided yet, but the writing is on the blades of the wind turbines. Propaganda rules the world, and it will continue ruling it as long as people fall for it. 

(*) Simon Sheridan provides an interesting discussion of the inner decisional mechanisms of modern society, defined as "esoteric" in the sense of being hidden, unlike the "exoteric," e.g. public decisional mechanism, which is only a reflection of the esoteric process. 

(**) For much longer-term scenarios, see my post: "The Next Ten Billion Years" 

Data without interpretation are useless, interpretation without data is dangerous. More on "non replaceable" energy

 

"Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without strategy is the noise before the defeat," Sun Tzu. (Image created with Dezgo.com)

I am always amazed by how people tend to see the world in terms of "self-evident" statements which the don't see as requiring demonstration, quantification, or verification. It is like if they were rewriting the American Declaration of Independence (We hold these truths to be self-evident...). But whereas things such as life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are hard to quantify, when you deal with physical entities such as renewable energy, then quantification is not only possible, but vital. 

On this point, Sun Tzu would have said that interpretation without quantification is dangerous because by dismissing renewable technologies you are disbanding your best troops without giving them a chance to prove their mettle in a real confrontation. 

Here, as an example, a recent post by Tim Morgan where we read a long discussion, interesting in many respects, but completely disconnected from real-world data. 

This is where the term “renewable” ought to be subjected to far more critical examination than it has tended to receive so far. We can’t source the plastics required for the renewables sector without hydrocarbon feedstocks. Renewables can’t, of themselves, power the extraction, processing and delivery of the vast amounts of concrete, steel, copper, cobalt, lithium and a host of other resources required for the development, maintenance and eventual replacement of wind and solar power.

In short, “renewables” would merit that label only if they were capable of renewing – that is to say, replacing – themselves over time. This isn’t possible now, and there are few reasons to suppose that it will become so in the future.

Morgan is not the only one who keeps repeating the mantra that renewables are unable to replace themselves without worrying too much about justifying his statement, something that would require, at minimum, demonstrating that the energy yield of renewable technology is too low for this purpose. But there is no attempt to do that in the post. 

Eventually, it doesn't matter what intellectuals are saying; the real world is moving along the path created by physics. The lines are drawn for a battle that's going to be fought over the carrion of the fossil fuel industry. Victory will go to those who can follow Sun Tzu's statement that “Opportunities multiply as they are seized.” And onward we'll go! 

(For a quantification of the capability of renewables to expand and replace themselves, see these references: 

100% Renewable Energy Transition by Kemfelt, Breyer, and Oei. 2020

On the History and Future of 100% Renewable Energy Systems Research, Breyer et al, 2022

Rethinking Energy 2020-2030, Dorr and Seba, 2022

The sower's way: quantifying the narrowing net-energy pathways to a global energy transition, Sgoruirdis, Csala, and Bardi, 2016

Energy Return on Investment of Major Energy Carriers: Review and Harmonization, Murphy et al., 2022

And many more....)

But what is this EROI (Energy Return on Energy Invested)? And why is it so Important?

 

If you are a lion, you don't just have to run faster than a gazelle; you have to make sure that the metabolic energy you obtain from eating the gazelle is higher than the energy you used for the chase. If not, you die. It is the harsh law of the EROI. 

The concept of Energy Return on Energy Invested (EROI or EROEI) has been around for a long time. It was introduced in its modern form in the 1980s by Charles Hall, but it is steeped in the thermodynamics of non-equilibrium systems. It can be easily understood if you see it as the equivalent of ROI (return on investment). ROI (EROI) is given by the money (energy) returned from a certain investment (energy infrastructure) divided by the monetary (energy) investment. You need a value larger than one in order for your investment to make sense or, if you are a lion, to survive. Large values of this parameter make life easy for investors, energy producers, and lions (although not for gazelles). (*)

Up to recent times, the conventional wisdom was that the EROI of fossil fuels was very high: during the heyday of oil extraction, it was said to be been around 100. Think of an investment that brings back to you back your capital multiplied by one hundred (!!), and you can understand why oil was, and remains, so important for our society. At the same time, the EROI of renewable energy was calculated to be of the order of 5-7, with some studies even placing it under 1. That gave rise to the narrative that only oil and other fossil fuels could sustain an industrial civilization and that renewables were not really so; at best they were "replaceables" as long as there was oil available. The consequence was an emphasis on social and political solutions: degrowth, energy saving, return to a rural economy, or, simply, accepting that we are all going to die soon. 

How fast things change! New studies, including one by Murphy et al., revealed that the EROI of oil may never have been so high. You need to take into account that oil in itself is useless: it needs to be transported, refined, and burned inside inefficient engines to provide energy for society. So, it is correct to calculate the EROI of oil at the "point of use" rather than at the "well mouth." Once that's done, it turns out that oil's EROI may well be (and have been) lower than 10. At the same time, technological progress and scale factors led to an improvement in the EROI of renewables (wind and photovoltaics) well over 10. 

Now, the paradigm is reversed. Renewables are truly renewable, while oil never was. That gives us a chance to revisit the dominant paradigm of how to face the energy crisis. The new paradigm is that we can rebuild a society that works on renewable power. It won't be the same as the one created by oil, and we may have to accept a considerable economic contraction in the process to get there. But it gives us a fighting chance to create a resilient and prosperous society. 

Of course, not everyone agrees on these concepts and there is a lively discussion in which several people are defending the old paradigm. One argument in the discussion says that if you use oil energy to refine oil, that energy should not be  counted in the denominator of the EROI ratio. And, therefore, that the EROI of fossil fuels is much larger than what the recent calculations indicate. This is silly: energy is energy, it doesn't matter where it comes from. Nafeez Ahmed discusses this point in detail in his blog, "The Age of Transformation" saying, among other things, that:

.... petroleum geologist Art Berman published a post also claiming that Murphy et. al’s paper is fundamentally incorrect. He concluded that if Murphy and his co-authors were right, then decades of EROI research showing extremely high values for fossil fuels would be wrong. He repeats the same argument as Hagens, and then uses it to offer a new calculation:

Nearly 9% of the total post-extraction costs for oil are for refining. Yet most of the energy for refining comes from the crude oil and refined products used in the refinery. It is, in effect, co-generated. That doesn’t negate the energy investment needed to operate the refinery but it is not a cost to society as indicated in the table… I divided their 8.9% for refining investment by 3 to account for the co-generation described above (it is probably much lower). The resulting oil EROI is 18. That completely removes the good news from Ahmed’s and Bardi’s proclamations of ‘mission accomplished’ and restores oil EROI to the consensus range for the last two decades.

The key error in this argument is where Berman says: “That doesn’t negate the energy investment needed to operate the refinery but it is not a cost to society as indicated in the table.”

But that is incorrect. The term ‘cost to society’ pertains precisely to energy invested which is not available for use by society. While the energy used to refine the crude oil is co-generated, it is still an input into the refinement process before the oil becomes available for actual work in society at the ‘final energy’ stage. In other words, the energy is being used to refine the oil and is therefore not available for society in any case.

What Berman and Hagens are effectively trying to do is classify the energy used to refine oil as an ‘energy output’ that represents useful work for society outside of the energy system. But this classification doesn’t make sense when we consider that it represents work that is specifically related to making the energy usable for society in the first place - because the oil must be refined and processed before it can actually be converted into usable energy for society.

Berman further questions that if EROI for fossil fuels was much lower, how could it have been so profitable?

As earth system scientist Ugo Bardi has pointed out, the profitability of an industry depends on numerous factors outside the energy system related to credit, markets, economic policy, investment, currency values and beyond. But in addition to that, the bottom line is that Murphy et. al’s research suggests that if oil has been profitable with EROI much lower than previously believed, then previous assumptions about economic prosperity requiring much higher EROI levels are questionable.

Because of the huge efficiency losses of converting energy from oil into useable forms (between 50 and 70% of energy is lost converting primary energy to final energy), as renewables avoid those losses they can produce about 50% less energy to meet demand. This means that the presumed minimum EROI to sustain a viable civilisation derived from fossil fuels could be much lower in a more efficient system.

As Marco Raugei points out, the shift to renewables and electrification “may open the door to achieving the required services with much lower demand for primary energy, which in turn entails that a significantly lower EROI than previously assumed may suffice”.

To learn more about EROI, you can look at these papers

The Role of Energy Return on Energy Invested (EROEI) in Complex Adaptive Systems, by Ilaria Perissi, Alessandro Lavacchi, and Ugo Bardi), Energies, 2021

Peaking Dynamics of the Production Cycle of a Nonrenewable Resource, by Ilaria Perissi, Alessandro Lavacchi, and Ugo Bardi, Sustainability 2023

Godzilla's Egg: Why Renewables Will Never Replace Fossil Fuels (Or Maybe They Will?)

An early incarnation of the most famous Japanese monster. Source

Being a reptile (maybe), Godzilla is supposed to be born from an egg. But it would be a big mistake to think that the adult beast will be small because the egg is small. Something similar applies to renewable energy, often criticized because it provides only a small fraction of the total energy in the world. In this post, I examine the "Godzilla's Egg Paradox" in view of two recent books, "How the World Really Works" by Vaclav Smil, and "The Economic Superorganism" by Carey King. 

The concept that "renewables will never be able to..." takes many forms, perhaps the most common one being that they provide today just a minor fraction of the energy produced by fossil fuels. And, hence, this fraction is destined to remain small. I often use the joke that it is the same as saying that Godzilla couldn't be but a small beast judging from the size of its egg.

A recent restatement of the Godzilla's egg problem can be found in the book by Vaclav Smil, "How the World Really Works." (Viking, 2022). Honestly, it is a disappointing book, especially comparing its content with the ambitious title. Not that there is anything specifically wrong with it. Smil has excellent capabilities of reporting quantitative data; his approach is simple and direct; a good example is his analysis of the average risks faced by an ordinary person in terms of their probability and frequency. 

But this book? Well, it reports a lot of data, but all in a conversational form, not a single diagram, not even a table. Maybe it is the way a book has to be if it has to become a "New York Times International Bestseller." After all, it is known that most people cannot understand cartesian diagrams. Yet, data are not sufficient if they are not interpreted in a correct time frame, and Smil's analysis is almost always static; it tells you about the current situation but not how we arrived at it nor what we can expect in the future.

The problem is especially visible with Smil's treatment of renewable energy. The whole discussion on energy is weak, to say nothing of the typical mistake of reporting that, during the oil crisis of the 1970s, OPEC (the organization of oil exporting countries) "set the prices" of oil. OPEC does not and cannot do anything like that, although its management of oil production surely affects prices.

About renewables, the main point that Smil makes is that, today, they represent only a small fraction of the world's energy production. Considering the huge task ahead, he concludes that renewables would need a very long time to replace fossil fuels, if they ever will. The main problem in this discussion is that Smil does not use the "EROI" (energy returned for energy invested) parameter. This parameter tells you that, nowadays, renewable energy is more efficient and yields more than fossil fuels and any other energy production technology. Missing this point, the whole discussion is flawed. Renewables can, and will grow rapidly, at least in the short term future. And, in the medium and long run they are destined to replace the inferior technology of fossil fuels. The same is true for many other data reported; they remain scarcely useful if not analyzed in a way that gives some idea of how they are going to evolve and change. Paradoxically, what this book lacks is exactly what the title promises: an explanation of how the world works.

The weakness of Smil's arguments does not mean that renewables will quickly replace fossil fuels. One thing is what is feasible, and another is what can actually be done within the limitations of time and resources. For some dynamic scenarios of their possible growth, you may take a look at a paper that I wrote together with my colleagues Sgouridis and Csala. It is a little old (2016), but its basic methods and conclusions are still valid. And the conclusion is that it is possible to replace fossil fuels with renewables, but not easy. What we can say at present is that renewables are growing fast: will they hatch into a full-size Godzilla, able to overcome the obstacles it faces?  

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If you really want to know how the world works and what role energy has in it, you can learn a lot more from Carey King's book "The Economic Superorganism" (Springer 2021). It is the opposite of Smil's book in terms of methodology. King's approach is based on the fundamental tenets of biophysical economics: it is an attempt to explain how the world's economic metabolism functions and dynamically evolves. Hence the title, "superorganism," a way to define the economic system in terms akin to that of a biological system (I prefer to use the term "holobiont" but it is the same idea.)

The idea that the economy is a superorganism derives from the concept that energy drives the economy, just like it does for living beings. The Economic Superorganism book provides stories, data, science, and philosophy to guide readers through the arguments from competing narratives on energy, growth, and policy. Among many other good things, it is remarkable for its honest attempt to present different points of view in a balanced way. It also helps to distinguish the technically possible from the socially viable, and understand how our future depends on this distinction. At global scales, the combination of resource-rich environment, coordination in groups, corporations and nations, and the maximization of financial surplus, tethered to energy and carbon, results in a mindless, energy-hungry, CO2 emitting Superorganism (a concept also examined in depth by Nate Hagens).

Now, the superorganism is in trouble. Just like living beings, it risks dying of starvation. Could it be a good thing, considering how the economic leviathan has damaged more or less everything in the biosphere? Or perhaps it is still possible to tame the big beast and force it to behave a little better. Maybe. Even though we may all be just cells of a huge beast, there is a lot that you can learn from this book. Unfortunately, even though it is clearly written and well argumented, it will never be a New York Times Bestseller. And that may be one of the reasons why the superorganism deserves to collapse.

And how about renewables? King's book doesn't take a yes/no position, and correctly so. It provides instead a complete discussion of the various facets of the issue. Just the description of the value of the EROI concept is worth the whole book. And, eventually, we'll go where the superorganism takes us.

Solving Renewables' Communication Problem. Don't Tell, Show!

 

Renewable Energy has a serious problem of communication: most people don't understand it. Since all communication is based on storytelling, I propose to face it by using the technique used in storytelling called "Don't tell, show." Telling people that renewables can produce energy is not enough; we need to show that they are useful. And that means focusing on "resilience." (image source)

Years ago, a colleague of mine told me a story about the photovoltaic plant he had installed, one of the first in Italy. He said that a high-rank politician came to visit it. To show him that the plant was really working, my colleague connected its output to a small electric heater, showing how the resistive heating elements could be rapidly brought to a nice red glow. The politician refused to believe that the energy came from the PV panels, and he asked, "Where is the trick?" Apparently, he left still unconvinced.  

I have my own stories about this kind of cognitive dissonance, and you probably have yours. Many people don't deny that renewables can produce energy but consider them little more than nice toys for Greens. Come on, to really produce energy, you need to burn something; coal, oil, or gas; you need a big fire and engines turning. Otherwise, it is a joke, no more than that. 

You can see this attitude expressed, over and over, in the comments on social media. In its basic form, it goes as, "Renewable energy will never be able to replace fossil fuels." Similar statements are common, including the idea that renewables are not really renewable but "substitutable" or "replaceable," meaning that fossil fuels will always be needed to replace old plants as they wear out. Normally, these statements are presented as self-evident, and some people seem to be offended and to become aggressive when told that the opposite may be true.  

Contrasting this attitude using data is nearly impossible. The scientific argument in favor of renewables is mostly based on life cycle analysis (LCA) that currently leads to favorable estimates for their EROI (energy return for energy invested). It means that renewables can be recycled and can sustain a circular economy. But most people (including politicians) don't understand EROI. They don't understand that the uncertainty in the EROI estimates is typical of all scientific matters; they want certainties. The attitude of scientists does not help. They tend to avoid public debates and disseminate their results only as papers in scientific journals. Papers that nobody reads and which are ignored when it is time to make policy choices. It is the same problem we have with climate science. 

So, I believe we have to change tack. Since all communication is based on storytelling, we may use a well-known rule in storytelling that says, "Do not tell, show!" That is, it is not enough to tell people about quantitative estimates of this or that. We need to show people how renewable energy can be useful for them here and now, not a hundred years from now,

It is, in the end, a question of positioning: in the current historical phase, renewables can be seen as a tool for resilience, a concept that most people understand and appreciate. Many people interpret this idea in terms of PV panels on their roofs and batteries at home as an emergency supply in case of blackouts. It is not a bad idea in itself, but it is expensive, and many people don't have the kind of space needed to install PV panels. "Resilience" is a wider concept, and, at present, it implies not only a defense against blackouts but a most needed help for people who are facing high energy prices affecting their activities and their personal budgets. 

In Italy, we are experimenting with an interesting initiative called "Energy Communities," legislation that allows citizens to link together their energy production plants, forming a local community that gives advantages to both producers and consumers. These communities are on a small scale, but the same concept can be enlarged as a general barrier against emergencies and supply disruption. It is a question of networking at various scales. It also includes large-scale plants; they are certainly more efficient than home-based ones. But they need to be accepted by the public, otherwise it is hopeless. 

Framing renewables in this way, we see that we are not aiming at "replacing fossil fuels." It is possible, in principle, but it can't be a short-term goal. If we aim at resilience, we don't need a 100% replacement of fossil fuels. A country like Germany already produces about 50% of its electric energy from renewable sources. At this level, the renewable infrastructure may act as a national-level UPS (uninterruptible power supply), keeping the lights on, and the essential services going (food, transportation, health care, and others). These are achievable objectives in the short and medium term. They are also steps forward to creating a truly sustainable, large scale energy system. 

My colleague had chosen the right way to tell the story when he showed a politician how he could operate an electric heater using his PV plant. But that wasn't enough. We need to show that renewables not only produce energy, but produce useful energy for the community. It will also be a concrete set of actions to fight climate change. It is the right path for the future.   

Renewables are not a cleaner cockroach, they are a new butterfly. A discussion with Dennis Meadows

  

Dennis Meadows (left in the image) and Ugo Bardi in Berlin, 2016

A few days ago, I received a message from Dennis Meadows, one of the authors of the 1972 study "The Limits to Growth," about a previous post of mine on "The Seneca Effect." I am publishing it here with his kind permission, together with my comments, and his comments on my comments. I am happy to report that after this exchange we are "99% in agreement."

Ugo, 

I read with interest you review of the Michaux/Ahmed debate. Normally I greatly benefit from your writing. But in this case it seemed to me that your text totally avoided addressing the central point - replacing fossil fuels as an energy source with renewables will require enormous amounts of metals and other resources which we have no reasonable basis for assuming will be available. It is not true that peak oil was presented principally as a prediction. Rather critics of Hubert's original analysis misrepresented it as an effort to predict in order to ridicule it -  just as Bailey did for the Limits to Growth natural resource data from World3. I was struck that your critique of Michaux did not contain a single piece of empirical data - the strong point of his research. Rather you engaged in what I term "proof by assertion."

I am personally convinced that there is absolutely no possibility for renewables to be expanded sufficiently that they will support current levels of material consumption. I attach the text of a memo I recently wrote to other members of the Belcher group stating this belief (*). 

Best regards Dennis Meadows

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Dear Dennis, 

first of all, it is always a pleasure to receive comments from you. It is not a problem to be in disagreement on some subjects -- the world would be boring if we all were! Besides, I think our disagreement is not so large once we understand certain assumptions. 

Let me start by saying that I fully agree with your statement that "there is absolutely no possibility for renewables to be expanded sufficiently that they will support current levels of material consumption." Not only is it impossible, but even if it were, we would not want that!

So, what do we disagree about? It is about the direction to take.  The fork in the path leads in two different directions depending on the efficiency of renewable technologies: Path 1): renewables are useless, and Path 2): renewables are just what we need. 

I strongly argue for Path 2) in the sense that we definitely do NOT need to "support current levels of material consumption" to create a sustainable and reasonably prosperous society. But let me explain what I mean by that.  

First, in my opinion, the problem with Michaux's report is that it underestimates the efficiency of renewable technologies. He says that renewables are not really renewable, just "replaceable." He, like others who use this term, means that the plants that we are now building will not be replaceable once fossil fuels are gone. In this case, creating a renewable infrastructure will be a waste of resources and energy (Path 1). 

This view may have been correct until a few years ago, but it is now obsolete. The recent scientific literature on the subject indicates that the efficiency of renewable technologies (expressed in terms of EROI, energy return on energy invested) is now significantly better than that of fossil fuels. Furthermore, it is large enough that the materials used can be recycled using renewable energy. There is a vast literature on this subject. On the specific question of the EROI, I suggest to you this paper by Murphy et al. You can also find an extensive bibliography of the field in our recent paper,  "On the history and future of 100% renewable research." 

Of course, not everything is easy to recycle, and a future renewable infrastructure will have to avoid the use of rare metals (such as platinum for fuel cells) or metals that are not rare, but not abundant enough for the task (such as copper, that will have to be largely replaced by aluminum). That is possible: the current generation of wind and PV plants is mostly based on abundant and recyclable materials. Doing even better is part of the natural evolution of technology. What we can't recycle, we won't use. 

There is a much more fundamental point in this discussion. It is the very concept that we need renewables to be able to "replace fossil fuels," in the sense of matching in quantitative terms the energy produced today (in some views, even exceeding it in order to "keep the economy growing"). This is impossible, as we all agree. The point is that renewables will greatly reduce the need for energy and materials to keep a complex civilization working. If you think, for instance, of how inefficient and wasteful our fossil-based transportation system is, you see that by switching to electric transportation and shared vehicles, we can have the same services for a much smaller consumption of resources. This concept has been expressed by Tony Seba in a form that I interpret as, "Renewables are not a cleaner caterpillar-- they are a new butterfly"

That doesn't mean that the geological limits of the transition aren't to be taken into account; the butterfly cannot fly higher than a certain height. Then, it may well be that we won't be able to move to renewables fast enough to avoid a societal, or even ecosystemic, crash. On this point, please take a look at a paper that I co-authored, where we used the term "the sower's strategy" to indicate that the transition is possible, but it will need hard work, as the peasants of old knew. But staying with fossil fuels is leading us to disaster (as you correctly say in the document for the Balaton group) while moving to nuclear fission simply means exchanging a fossil fuel (hydrocarbons) for another fossil fuel (uranium). Going renewables is a fighting chance, but I believe it is the only chance we have.   

There is an even more fundamental point that goes beyond a certain technology being more efficient than another. Going renewables, as Nafeez Ahmed correctly points out, is a switch from a predatory economy to a bioeconomy.  Our industrial sphere should imitate the biosphere that has been using minerals from the Earth's crust on land for the past 350 million years (at least) and never ran out of anything. As I said elsewhere, we need to do what the biosphere does, that is:

1. Use only minerals that are abundant.

2. Use them sparingly and efficiently.

3. Recycle ferociously. 

If we can do that, we have a unique opportunity in the history of humankind. It means we can build a society that does not destroy everything in order to satisfy human greed. Can we do it? As always, reality will be the ultimate judge. 

Ugo

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The answer from Dennis Meadows

Ugo, 

Thank you for sending me your article. I agree that the main difference of opinion lies in the direction to take. I am reminded of the defining characteristic of professors - two people who agree on 99% and spend all their time focusing on and debating the other one percent. Because I largely agree with you, my only relevant comment on what you say is that you have overly limited our options: 

So, what do we disagree about? It is about the direction to take.  The fork in the path leads in two different directions depending on the efficiency of renewable technologies: Path 1): renewables are useless, and Path 2): renewables are just what we need. 

I would not choose either path; rather I believe it is time to quit focusing on fossil energy scarcity as a source of our problems and start concentrating on fragility. The debate -renewables versus fossil - is a distraction from considering the important options for increasing the resilience of society.

Dennis Meadows

___________________________________________

A minor point. You say, "It is not true that peak oil was presented principally as a prediction." I beg to differ. I have been a member of ASPO (the Association for the Study of Peak Oil) almost from inception and part of its scientific committee as long as the association existed. And I can say that one of the problems of the approach of peak oilers was a certain obsession with the date of the peak. That doesn't disqualify a group of people whom I still think included some of the best minds on this planet during that period. The problem was that few of them were experts in modeling, and models are like weapons: you need to know the rules before you try to use them. By the way, you and your colleagues didn't make this mistake in your "Limits to Growth" in 1972; correctly, you were always careful of presenting a fan of scenarios, not a prediction. Later on, Bailey and his ilk accused you of having done what you didn't do: "wrong predictions." But that was politics, another story. 

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(*) Statements about being realistic about technology, alternative energy, and sustainability
Dennis Meadows

April 11, 2023 message to the Balaton Group

Dear Colleagues,

I have often described politics as the art of choosing which of several impossible outcomes you most prefer. It is important to envision good outcomes. It may be useful to strive for them. But it is important to be realistic. The recent discussion about technology, alternative energy, and sustainability are based on several implicit assumptions, which I believe are unrealistic. At the risk of being an old grump, and recognizing my own limited vision, I list here some statements that I believe from the study of science, history, and human nature to be realistic.

#1: There is no possibility that the so-called renewable energy sources will permit the elimination of fossil fuels and sustain current levels of economic activity and material well- being. The scramble for access to declining energy sources is likely to produce violence. 

#2: The planet will not sustain anywhere close to 9 billion people at living standards close to their aspirations (or our views about what is fair).

#3: Sustainable development is about how you travel, not where you are going.

#4: The privileged will not willingly sacrifice their own advantages to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor (witness the US.) They will lose their advantages, but unwillingly.

#5: The rapidly approaching climate chaos will erode society's capacity for constructive action before it prompts it.

#6: Expansion and efficiency are taken as unquestioned goals for society. They need to be replaced by sufficiency and resilience.

#7: History does not unfold in a smooth, linear, gradual process. Big, drastic discontinuities lie ahead - soon. 

#8: When a group of people believe they must choose between options that offer more order or those affording greater liberty, they will always opt for order. 

Unfortunately so, since it will have grave implications for the evolution of society’s governance systems. Dictators will always promise less chaos than Democrats.

The Growth of Photovoltaic Energy Continues!

 

Given the rapid advance of photovoltaic energy during the past few years, I think it is appropriate to repropose a post that I published some years ago on "Cassandra's Legacy" -- it was an easy prophecy to make, but it is a satisfaction to see that it is coming true. If we keep going at the current rate, in a couple of decades, fossil fuels will be memory, just like steam locomotives. 

From "Cassandra's Legacy"

Monday, August 15, 2016

Five billion years of energy supply: the "stereosphere" and the upcoming photovoltaic revolution

It seems to be popular nowadays to maintain that photovoltaic energy is just an "extension" of fossil energy and that it will fade away soon after we run out of fossils fuels. But photovoltaics is much more than just a spinoff of fossil energy, it is a major metabolic revolution in the ecosystem, potentially able to create a "stereosphere" analogous to the "biosphere" that could last as long as the remaining lifetime of the earth's ecosystem and possibly much more. Here are some reflections of mine, not meant to be the last word on the subject, but part of an ongoing study that I am performing. You can find more on a similar subject in a paper of mine on Biophysical Economics and Resource Quality, (BERQ)

"Life is nothing but an electron looking for a place to rest," is a sentence attributed to Albert Szent-Györgyi. It is true: the basis of organic life as we know it is the result of the energy flow generated by photosynthesis. Sunlight promotes an electron to a high energy state in the molecule of chlorophyll. Then, the excited electron comes to rest when a CO2 molecule reacts with hydrogen stripped away from an H2O molecule in order to form the organic molecules that are the basis of biological organisms. That includes replacing degraded chlorophyll molecules and the chloroplasts that contain them with new ones. The cycle is called "metabolism" and it has been going on for billions of years on the earth's surface. It will keep going as long as there is sunlight to power it and there are nutrients that can be extracted from the environment. 

But, if life means using light to excite an electron to a higher energy state, there follows that chlorophyll is not the only entity that can do that. In the figure at the beginning of this post, you see the solid state equivalent of a chlorophyll molecule: a silicon-based photovoltaic cell. It promotes an electron to a higher energy state; then this electron finds rest after having dissipated its potential by means of chemical reactions or physical processes. That includes using the potentials generated to manufacturing new photovoltaic cells and the related structures to replace the degraded ones. In analogy with the biological metabolism, we could call this process "solid state metabolism". Then, the similarities between the carbon-based metabolic chain and the silicon-based one are many. So much that we could coin the term "stereosphere" (from the Greek term meaning "solid.") as the solid-state equivalent of the well known "biosphere". Both the biosphere and the stereosphere use solar light as the energy potential necessary to keep the metabolic cycle going and they build-up metabolic structures using nutrients taken from the earth's surface environment.

The main nutrient for the biosphere is CO2, taken from the atmosphere, while the stereosphere consumes SiO2, taking it from the geosphere. Both metabolic chains use a variety of other nutrients: the stereosphere can reduce the oxides of metals such as aluminum, iron, and titanium, and use them as structural or functional elements in their metallic form; whereas the biosphere can only use carbon polymers. The biosphere stores information mostly in specialized carbon-based molecules called deoxyribonucleic acids (DNA). The stereosphere stores it mostly in silicon-based components called "transistors". Mechanical enactors are called "muscles" in the biosphere and are based on protein filaments that contract as a consequence of changing chemical potentials. The equivalent mechanical elements in the stereosphere are called "motors" and are based on the effects of magnetic fields on metallic elements. For each element of one of these systems, it is possible to find a functional equivalent of the other, even though their composition and mechanisms of operation are normally completely different.

A major difference in the two systems is that the biosphere is based on microscopic self-reproducing cells. The stereosphere, instead, has no recognizable cells and the smallest self-reproducing unit is something that could be defined as the "self-reproducing solar plant factory." A factory that can build not only solar plants but also new solar plant factories. Obviously, such an entity includes a variety of subsystems for mining, refining, transporting, processing, assembling, etc. and it has to be very large. Today, all these elements are embedded in the system called the "industrial system." (also definable as the "technosphere"). This system is powered, at present, mainly by fossil fuels but, in the future, it would be transformed into something fully powered by the dissipation of solar energy potentials. This is possible as long as the flow of energy generated by the system is as large or larger than the energy necessary to power the metabolic cycle. This requirement appears to be amply fulfilled by current photovoltaic technologies (and other renewable ones).

A crucial question for all metabolic processes is whether the supply of nutrients (i.e. minerals) can be maintained for a long time. About the biosphere, evidently, that's the case: the geological cycles that reform the necessary nutrients are part of the concept of "Gaia", the homeostatic system that has kept the biosphere alive for nearly four billion years. About the stereosphere, most of the necessary nutrients are abundant in the earth's crust (silicon and aluminum being the main ones) and easily recoverable and recyclable if sufficient energy is available. Of course, the stereosphere will also need other metals, several of which are rare in the earth's crust, but the same requirement has not prevented the biosphere from persisting for billions of years. The geosphere can recycle chemical elements by natural processes, provided that they are not consumed at an excessively fast rate. This is an obviously complex issue and we cannot exclude that the cost of recovering some rare element will turn out to be a fundamental obstacle to the diffusion of the stereosphere. At the same time, however, there is no evidence that this will be the case.

So, can the stereosphere expand on the earth's surface and become a large and long-lasting metabolic cycle? In principle, yes, but we should take into account a major obstacle that could prevent this evolution to occur. It is the "Allee effect" well known for the biosphere and that, by similarity, should be valid for the stereosphere as well. The idea of the Allee effect is that there exists  a minimum size for a biological population that allows it to be stable and recover from perturbations. Too few individuals may not have sufficient resources and reciprocal interactions to avoid extinction after a collapse. In the case of the stereosphere, the Allee effect means that there is a minimum size for the self-reproducing solar plant factory that will allow it to be self-sustaining and long-lasting. Have we reached the "tipping point" leading to this condition? At present, it is impossible to say, but we cannot exclude that it has been reached or that it will be reached before the depletion of fossil fuels will bring the collapse of the current industrial system.

The next question is whether a self-sustaining stereosphere can coexist with the organic biosphere. According to Gause's law, well known in biology, two different species cannot coexist in the same ecological niche; normally one of the two must go extinct or be marginalized. Solid state and photosynthetic systems are in competition with each other for solar light. There follows that the stereosphere could replace the biosphere if the efficiency of solid state transduction systems were to turn out higher than that of photosynthetic systems. But this is not obvious. PV cells today appear to be more efficient than photosynthetic plants in terms of the fraction of solar energy processed but we need to consider the whole life cycle of the systems and, at present, a reliable assessment is difficult. We should take into account, anyway, that solid state creatures don't need liquid water, don't need oxygen, are not limited to local nutrients, and can exist in a much wider range of temperatures than biological ones. It means that the stereosphere can expand to areas forbidden to the biosphere: dry deserts, mountaintops, polar deserts, and more. Silicon based creatures are also scarcely affected by ionizing radiation, so they can survive in space without problems. These considerations suggest that the stereosphere may occupy areas and volumes where it is not in direct competition with the biosphere.

The characteristics of the stereosphere also allow it the capability of surviving catastrophes that may deeply damage the biosphere and that will eventually cause its extinction. For instance, the stereosphere could survive an abrupt climate change (although not a "Venus Catastrophe" of the kind reported by James Hansen). Over the long run, in any case, the earth's biosphere is destined to be sterilized by the increasing intensity of the solar irradiation over times of the order of a billion years. (and smaller for multicellular organisms). The stereosphere would not be affected by this effect and could continue existing for the five billion of years in which the sun will remain in the main sequence. Possibly, it could persist for much longer, even after the complex transformations that would lead the sun to become a white dwarf. A white dwarf could, actually power PV systems perhaps for a trillion years!

A more detailed set of considerations of mine on a related subject can be found in this article on "Biophysical Economics and Resource Quality, BERQ). 

Notes: 

1. I am not discussing here whether the possible emergence of the stereosphere is a good or a bad thing from the viewpoint of humankind. It could give us billions of years of prosperity or lead us to rapid extinction. It seems unlikely, anyway, that humans will choose whether they want to have it or not on the basis of rational arguments while they still have the power to decide something on the matter. 

2. The concept of a terrestrial metabolic system called the stereosphere is not equivalent, and probably not even similar, to the idea of the "technological singularity" which supposes a very fast increase of artificial intelligence. The "self-reproducing solar plant factory" needs not be more intelligent than a bacterium; it just needs to store a blueprint of itself and instructions about replication. Intelligence is not necessarily useful for survival, as humans may well discover to their chagrin in the near future.

3. About the possibility of a photovoltaic-powered Dyson sphere around a white dwarf, see this article by Ibrahim Semiz and Salim O˘gur.

4. The idea of "silicon-based life" was popularized perhaps for the first time by Stanley Weinbaum who proposed his "Pyramid Monster" in his short story "A Martian Odissey" published in 1933. Weinbaum's clumsy monster could not exist in the real universe, but it was a remarkable insight, nevertheless.